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Abstract
Education has been one of the key determinants of economic growth around the world since
1965. In this paper, we discuss three different measures of education, and consider their
relationship to the distribution of income as measured by the Gini coefficient as well as to
economic growth across countries. The three measures are: (a) gross secondary-school
enrolment, (b) public expenditure on education relative to national income and (c) expected
years of schooling for girls. We show that all three measures of education are directly related
to income equality across countries. In a sample of 87 countries at all income levels, we also
find that more and better education appears to encourage economic growth directly as well as
indirectly through increased social equality and cohesion. Our regression results survive the
introduction of regional dummy variables for Africa, Asia and Central and South America.
We argue that the empirical relationship between education, on the one hand, and growth and
equality, on the other hand, can help account for the positive correlation between the two
latter variables that has been documented in the literature. 
JEL I28, O15, O40. 
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It is a widely held view among economists that economic efficiency and social 
equality are incompatible if not outright mutually exclusive. The perceived but poorly 
documented trade-off between efficiency and equality is sometimes regarded as one 
of the main tenets of modern welfare economics. One of the key ideas behind this 
perception is that increased inequality enhances private as well as social returns to 
education and to exerting effort in the hope of attaining a higher standard of living. 
Redistributive policies may then thwart these tendencies and blunt incentives by 
penalizing the affluent through taxation and rewarding the poor. Economic efficiency 
– both static and dynamic – suffers in the process, or so the argument goes.  
The revival of economic growth theory in recent years has brought dynamic 
efficiency to the fore. The empirical testing of the theory has involved estimating 
reduced-form equations in cross sections (sometimes also panels) of countries where 
the dependent variable is the average rate of growth of output per capita over a long 
period and the right-hand side of the equation has initial output per capita – to capture 
a catch-up effect, or convergence – and a set of other possible explanatory variables 
among the regressors. More often than not, measures of income equality have turned 
out to have a positive effect on economic growth across countries. Thus Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996) report that equality is 
good for growth.
1 These empirical results – showing, by and large, that rapid growth 
tends to go together with more, not less, equality – have helped to inspire a number of 
authors to attempt an explanation.  
Numerous models have been developed to explain the apparent absence of a trade-
off between efficiency and equality. First, large inequalities of income and wealth 
may trigger political demands for transfers and redistributive taxation. To the extent 
that transfers and taxation distort incentives to work, save and invest, inequality may 
impede growth. A classic example of the effects of such a system of taxes and 
transfers is regional transfers in Italy. High taxes in northern Italy are used to 
subsidize ailing enterprises and public employment in the south, the Mezzogiorno. 
                                                 
1 Barro (2000) uses a panel of countries over the period from 1965 to 1995 to estimate the 
relationship between economic growth and equality and finds – by studying the interaction of the 
Gini coefficient and the initial level of income in a growth regression – that increased equality 
tends to increase growth in poor countries and retard growth in richer countries, but he finds no 
support for a relationship between equality and growth in his sample as a whole.  
 
  1These subsidies have been shown to distort incentives and create inefficiencies in both 
parts of the country. At a theoretical level, an increase in the rate of redistributive 
taxation on capital tends to reduce the return to saving and hence lower the long-run 
rate of growth of output per capita.
2 Moreover, the initial extent of inequality 
probably makes a difference. An equalization of incomes and wealth in countries with 
gross inequities, such as Brazil where the Gini coefficient is 60, would seem likely to 
foster social cohesion and peace and thus to strengthen incentives rather than weaken 
them, whereas in places like Denmark and Sweden, where the Gini coefficient is 25 
and incomes and wealth are thus already quite equitably distributed by world 
standards, further equalization might well have the opposite effect. Excessive 
inequality may be socially divisive and hence inefficient: it may motivate the poor to 
engage in illegal activities and riots, or at least to divert resources from productive 
uses, both the resources of the poor and those of the state. Social conflict over the 
distribution of income, land or other assets can take place through labour unrest, for 
instance, or rent seeking which can hinder investment and growth (see Benhabib and 
Rustichini, 1996). Also, national saving may be affected by inequality if the marginal 
propensity to save depends on the level of income, i.e., if the rich have a higher 
propensity to save than the poor (see Kaldor, 1956). In this case inequality may be 
good for growth in that the greater the level of inequality, the higher is the saving rate 
and hence also the rate of investment and economic growth.
3 Unfortunately for this 
line of thought, Barro (2000) finds no empirical evidence of a link between inequality 
and investment, but we do.  
At last, it is easy to think of ways in which increased equality may help strengthen 
education rather than hurting it as suggested by the political-economy literature 
reviewed in brief at the beginning of this discussion. If so, increased equality may 
thereby also encourage economic growth through education. Galor and Zeira (1993), 
Aghion (1998) and Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa (1999) argue that this 
outcome is likely in the presence of imperfect capital markets. To see this, imagine 
that each member of society has a fixed number of investment opportunities, 
                                                 
2 It is not clear, however, that this type of political-cum-fiscal explanation necessarily implies an 
inverse relationship between inequality and growth, for it is possible that during the redistribution 
phase increased equality and a drop in growth go hand in hand, especially in panel data that reflect 
developments over time country by country as well as cross-sectional patterns. However, Perotti 
(1996) finds little empirical support for this type of explanation. 
3 Against this Todaro (1997) suggests that the rich may invest in an unproductive manner – think 
  2imperfect access to credit and different endowments of inherited wealth. In such a 
world the rich would end up using up many of their investment opportunities while 
the poor could only use a few. Therefore, the marginal return from the last investment 
opportunity of the rich would be much lower than the marginal return of the last 
investment opportunity of the poor. Redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor 
would increase output because the poor would then invest in more productive projects 
at the margin. This argument can also be applied to investment in human capital if we 
assume diminishing returns to education. In this case, taking away the last few 
quarters of the university education of the elite and adding time to the more 
elementary education of the poor would raise output and perhaps also long-run 
growth, other things being equal. Income redistribution would reverse the decline in 
investment in human capital resulting from the credit-market failure.
  
                                                                                                                                           
The main aim of this paper is to explore empirically the possible relationships and 
interactions among equality, education and economic growth in a sample of 87 
industrial and developing countries in the period from 1965 to 1998. The empirical 
relationship between the initial level of human capital and economic growth is well 
established and appears to be more robust than the relationship between measures of 
equality and growth. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we consider further 
explanations for the apparent relationship between equality and growth in the data. In 
Section 3, we present cross-country correlations between three different measures of 
education, equality and economic growth, and thus allow the data to speak for 
themselves. In Section 4, we attempt to dig a little deeper and report the results of 
multiple regression analysis where growth is traced to education and equality as well 
as a number of other factors commonly used in growth regression analysis, and where 
some of the determinants of growth, including education and equality, hang together. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Income distribution, education and growth 
We have described several possible explanations for the positive association between 
equality and growth found in the data.  In an accompanying paper (Gylfason and 
Zoega, 2003b), we propose a model that embeds some of the mechanisms described in 
the previous section in an overlapping-generations context. We will discuss this model 
 
of yachts and expensive cars. 
  3briefly here.  
Imagine a world where, not unrealistically, parents support their children who then 
spend their parental allowance on consumption and education and save the rest in the 
form of physical capital (think of stocks!). They then enter the labour market, endowed 
with their human capital, or education, as well as their initial savings plus any 
inheritance left over by their (by now deceased) parents. During their working life 
their savings are augmented when wage income is only partly spent on consumption, 
or given to the next generation, the rest being added to savings, hence the capital 
stock. When this generation finally passes away their capital it is left over to the 
young. The world continues forever but each individual has a finite lifespan.  
This framework presents a familiar picture of parents supporting their children and 
then leaving the remainder of their wealth to the young generation. The young acquire 
both human capital – through education – and physical capital – mostly from 
inheritance – and then make a living as adults, consume, and support the next 
generation and finally leave their remaining wealth to that generation.   
In such a setting endogenous growth can arise because of complementarities 
between human and physical capital. Diminishing returns to either factor of production 
never set in because both factors grow together – there is no fixed factor of production. 
When schools are improved, and a given amount of spending on education results in 
more human capital acquired, this causes the expected rate of return on human capital 
to fall and hence increases the attraction of investing in physical capital, which calls 
for increased savings and investment. The complementarity of human and physical 
capital generates an AK production technology where savings and education can 
sustain growth in the long run. 
But how can such a model account for the positive association between equality 
and growth found in the data? The key lies in diminishing returns to education 
expenditures. If spending a dollar to further the education of the less educated 
generates more human capital than the same dollar spent on a person with a better 
educational background, then improving the efficiency of schools providing basic 
education – at the expense of those giving elite education – will both enhance equality 
as well as raising the supply of human capital at the national level. The latter will – 
through a familiar channel – raise the rate of return on physical capital compared with 
the rate of return on human capital, and this, in turn, generates further saving, 
investment and growth. The system of education is thus the force that affects both the 
  4extent of equality and the pace of growth: improvements in the general level of 
education enhance both equality and growth. Moreover, increased equality will 
equalize bequests, thereby promoting equality in education and income further still, 
and higher rates of economic growth.  
 
3. Cross-country patterns in the data 
The empirical question that we address in this section is this: Does education 
encourage growth also by enhancing economic and social equality? – provided that 
equality is also good for growth.   
Let us begin by looking at the cross-country pattern of inequality, economic 
growth and investment. Figure 1a shows a scatterplot of the annual rate of growth of 
gross national product (GNP) per capita from 1965 to 1998 (World Bank, 2000, Table 
1.4) and the inequality of income or consumption as measured by the Gini coefficient 
(same source, Table 2.8).
4 The growth rate has been adjusted for initial income: the 
variable on the vertical axis is that part of economic growth that is not explained by 
the country’s initial stage of development, obtained as a residual from a regression of 
growth during 1965-1998 on initial GNP per head (i.e., in 1965) as well as natural 
capital, taken from World Bank (1997).
5 This adjustment obviates the need to view 
high-income countries and low-income countries separately. Even so, if rich countries 
and poor are considered separately, a similar pattern is observed in both groups (not 
shown). The 75 countries shown in the figure are represented by one observation 
each.
6 The regression line through the scatterplot suggests that an increase of about 12 
points on the Gini scale from one country to another – corresponding, for example, to 
                                                 
4 Our sample does not include any transition economies because, for them, there is no information 
available on natural capital, which is one of the key determinants of growth in our framework. See 
Gylfason and Zoega (2001).  
5 The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which income (or, in some cases, consumption) 
among individuals or households deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini coefficient of 
zero represents perfect equality (all individuals receive the same income) while a Gini coefficient 
of 100 means perfect inequality (the national income accrues to one individual). While Gini 
coefficients based on net (i.e., after-tax) incomes are preferable in principle as measures of income 
inequality, the Gini coefficients published by the World Bank are more often than no based on 
gross (i.e., before-tax) incomes. Hence, the equalizing effects of taxes and transfer schemes on the 
distribution of income are not fully reflected in the Gini coefficients used here. The data come 
from nationally representative household surveys and refer to different years between 1983-85 and 
1998-99. See World Bank (2000), Table 2.8.  
6 All countries for which the requisite data are available are included in Figures 1-4, without 
exception.   
  5the difference in income distribution between India (Gini = 38) and Zambia (Gini = 
50) – is associated with a decrease in per capita growth by one percentage point per 
year on average. The relationship is statistically significant (Spearman’s rank 
correlation r = -0.50).
7 A reduction in a country’s annual per capita growth rate by 
one percentage point is a serious matter because the (weighted) average rate of per 
capita growth in the world economy since 1965 has been about 1½ percent per year.  
 
Figure 1a. Inequality and Economic Growth
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Figure 1b displays a scatterplot of average gross domestic investment from 1965 
to 1998 and the Gini coefficient in the same 75 countries as before. Here again we see 
an inverse correlation, albeit not as strong as in Figure 1a. The regression line through 
the plot suggests that an increase of about 10 points on the Gini scale from one 
country to another is associated with a decrease in investment by one percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP). The relationship is statistically significant (r = -0.28). The 
outlier in the northeast corner of the scatter is Lesotho;
8 if we exclude Lesotho from 
the regression, the rank correlation rises in absolute value to -0.32 and the slope of the 
regression line increases from -0.10 to -0.15, in which case an increase in the Gini 
                                                 
7 Elsewhere, we have reported similar cross-country correlations between economic growth and 
both land inequality (r = -0.37) and gender inequality (r = -0.32). In our data, the distribution of 
income and land is highly correlated (r = 0.57) whereas the distribution income and educational 
opportunities of the sexes is not (r = -0.04). See Gylfason and Zoega (2003a).  
8 We could be excused for excluding Lesotho because its singularly high investment rate can be 
explained by a single gigantic project, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.  
  6coefficient by 10 points from one place to another goes along with a decrease in 
investment by 1½ percent of GDP.  
 
Figure 1b. Inequality and Investment
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In sum, the data seem compatible with the view that increased inequality in the 
distribution of income goes hand in hand with less investment and less rapid 
economic growth across countries. Even so, we are aware that two-dimensional 
correlations do not allow us to distinguish cause from effect. We intend the 
correlations presented in this section merely to describe the data in ways that are 
consistent with the results of the multiple regression analysis in Section 5 where 
several possible determinants of growth are taken into account side by side.  
Let us now consider three different measures of education inputs, outcomes and 
participation and how they vary with inequality and economic growth. Figure 2 shows 
scatterplots of public expenditure on education from 1980 to 1997 as reported by 
UNESCO (see World Bank, 2000, Table 2.9) and (a) inequality and (b) growth as 
measured above. Public expenditure on education varies a great deal from country to 
country. In the 1990s, some countries have spent as little as 1 percent of their GNP on 
education (Haiti, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria and Sudan). Others have spent 
between 8 percent and 10 percent of their GNP on education, including St. Lucia, 
Namibia, Botswana and Jordan, in descending order. Public expenditure is admittedly 
  7an imperfect measure of a nation’s commitment to education, not least because some 
nations spend more on private education than others.
9  
 
Figure 2a. Expenditure on Education and 
Inequality















































Figure 2b. Expenditure on Education and 
Economic Growth 1965-1998



























































































                                                 
9 Moreover, public expenditure on education may be supply-led and of mediocre quality, and may 
thus fail to foster efficiency, equality and growth, in contrast to private expenditure on education, 
which is generally demand-led and thus, perhaps, likely to be of a higher quality. Even so, this 
yardstick should reflect at least to some extent the government’s commitment to education.  
  8The regression line through the 75 observations in Figure 2a suggests that an 
increase in public expenditure on education by one percent of GNP from one country 
to the next is associated with a decrease of 2.3 points on the Gini scale.
10 This pattern 
can be interpreted either as a sign of the equalizing effects of more public education 
expenditure or of the education-enhancing effects of less dispersion of education and 
income, or both. The relationship is statistically significant (r = -0.36). The regression 
line through the 87 observations in Figure 2b suggests that an increase of about 3½ 
percentage points in public expenditure on education relative to GNP from one 
country to the next is associated with an increase in per capita growth by one 
percentage point. This relationship is also statistically significant, even if it is not 
particularly strong (r = 0.29). Taken together, the two plots suggest that an increase in 
education spending by the equivalent of 3½ percent of GNP goes hand in hand with 
an eight point decrease in the Gini coefficient and a one percentage point increase in 
per capita growth on average, thus helping explain the observed cross-country 
relationship between inequality and growth in Figure 1a. These results are consistent 
with the theoretical explanation proposed in Section 2 above. A third variable, 
education expenditures, contributes to both increased equality as well and higher 
growth.  
 
Figure 3a. Years of Schooling and Inequality
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10 Here, unlike in Figures 1a and 1b, Gini coefficients based on the distribution of gross income 
rather than net income are the most relevant measures of inequality because more and better 
education can be expected to equalize income before taxes and transfers (see footnote 5).  
  9Figure 3b. Years of Schooling and Economic 
Growth 1965-1998
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Figure 3 shows scatterplots of the expected number of years of schooling for 
females from 1980 to 1997 and (a) inequality and (b) growth as before. This indicator 
of schooling is intended to reflect the total education resources, measured in school 
years, that a girl will acquire over her lifetime in school or as an indicator of an 
education system’s overall state of development. We stress female education not 
because using male education would produce weaker results – in fact, the results we 
get from our sample are virtually the same for both genders (not shown). Rather, we 
stress the education of girls because the early empirical literature on education and 
growth did not detect economically and statistically significant effects on growth of 
female education at any level. In Figure 3a, the regression line through the 46 
observations, one per country, suggests that an increase by one year of the schooling 
that an average girl at the age of school entry can expect to receive is associated with 
a decrease in the Gini coefficient, i.e., increased equality, by almost one point. The 
relationship is statistically significant (r = -0.49). Unlike the relationship in Figure 2a, 
the one in Figure 3a is significantly non-linear (not shown), suggesting that the 
marginal effect of increased education on equality is rising in the level of enrolment – 
that is, there may be increasing returns to schooling in terms of equality.
11 The 
corresponding relationship for males (not shown) is virtually the same as for females. 
Figure 3b shows the cross-country relationship between growth and years of 
                                                 
11 Sen (1999), among others, emphasizes the importance of educating girls in developing countries.  
  10schooling. The regression line through the 49 observations suggests that an extension 
of schooling by about four years is associated with an increase in annual economic 
growth by one percentage point. The relationship is significant (r = 0.50). Between 
them, the two charts suggest that an extension of schooling by about four years goes 
hand in hand with a four point decrease in the Gini coefficient and a one percentage 
point increase in per capita growth on average, thus again helping explain the inverse 
relationship between inequality and growth in Figure 1a.  
 
Figure 4a. School Enrolment and Inequality
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Figure 4b. School Enrolment and Economic 
Growth 1965-1998


























































































  11Secondary-school enrolment is probably the most commonly used indicator of 
education in empirical growth research. Figure 4 shows scatterplots of gross 
secondary-school enrolment for both genders from 1980 to 1997 and (a) inequality 
and (b) growth as before. The regression line that passes through the 75 observations 
in Figure 4a suggests that an increase in the secondary-school enrolment rate by about 
five percentage points from one place to another goes along with a decrease by one 
point on the Gini scale. The regression is statistically significant (r = -0.54). Like the 
relationship in Figure 3a, the one in Figure 4a is significantly non-linear (not shown). 
At last, Figure 4b shows the cross-country relationship between growth and school 
enrolment. The regression line through the 87 observations suggests that an increase 
in secondary-school enrolment by 25-30 percentage points is associated with an 
increase in annual per capita growth by one percentage point. Unlike the relationships 
in Figures 2b and 3b, the one in Figure 4b is significantly non-linear (not shown), as 
might be expected from diminishing returns to education. In any case, the relationship 
is highly significant (r = 0.69), more so than in Figures 2b and 3b. Of the three 
indicators used here, secondary-school enrolment is the one that is most closely 
correlated with economic growth. Together, the two charts suggest that an increase in 
secondary-school enrolment by 25-30 percentage points goes hand in hand with a six 
point decrease in the Gini coefficient and a one percentage point increase in per capita 
growth on average, thus, once more, illuminating the inverse relationship between 
inequality and growth in Figure 1.  
We now turn to multivariate regression analysis of education, inequality, 
investment and growth.  
 
 4. Regression analysis 
Table 1 reports seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates of a system of four 
equations for the 87 countries in our sample for the years 1965-1998.  
The first equation shows how economic growth depends on  
(i)  the logarithm of initial per capita income (i.e., in 1965), defined as income in 
1998 divided by an appropriate growth factor,  
(ii)  the share of natural capital in national wealth (which comprises physical, 
human and natural capital),  
(iii)  the share of gross domestic investment in GDP in 1965-1998,  
  12(iv)  the logarithm of the secondary-school enrolment rate (the logarithm in order 
to capture diminishing returns to education) and  
(v)  the Gini coefficient.  
The second equation shows the relationship between the investment rate and the 
logarithm of the enrolment rate in accordance with the results derived from the model 
sketched in Section 2 where we argued that education encourages investment in 
physical capital. Investment also depends on the natural capital share; the underlying 
reason is that the more abundant are natural resources in relation to GDP, the smaller 
the share of physical capital in GDP and the weaker is the incentive to save and invest 
by the Golden Rule (Gylfason and Zoega, 2001).  
The third equation shows how the enrolment rate depends on initial income 
(because wealthy countries can afford to spend more on education) as well as on 
natural capital (as in Gylfason, 2001, and Gylfason and Zoega, 2001; the idea behind 
this formulation is that the natural-resource-intensive sector may use workers with 
fewer skills than the manufacturing sector).  
The fourth and last equation shows the relationship between the Gini coefficient 
and the enrolment rate that we documented in Section 3. The recursive nature of the 
system and the conceivable correlation of the error terms in the four equations make 
SUR an appropriate estimation procedure (Lahiri and Schmidt, 1978). However, the 
fact that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the system (not shown) are almost 
the same as the SUR estimates shown in Table 1 indicates that the correlation of 
errors terms across equations is of minor consequence.  
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  13All the coefficient estimates shown in Table 1 are economically as well as 
statistically significant with one exception: the effect of enrolment on investment is 
marginally insignificant at the 0.05 level. The coefficient on initial income in the 
growth equation suggests that the speed of convergence is about 1 percent per year. 
The direct effect of natural capital on growth is -0.06 and the indirect effect through 
investment and education is -0.13·0.10 – 0.70·(0.83/E) – 0.70·(1.42/E)·0.10 ≈  -0.03, 
the latter evaluated at the median value of the enrolment rate, E = 35. The total effect 
of natural capital on growth is thus about -0.09 for given initial income.  
Of greater interest here, however, are the effects of education and inequality on 
growth. The first equation in Table 1 shows the direct effect of education on growth to 
be 0.83/E ≈ 0.02 at the median value of the enrolment rate; this means that an increase 
in the enrolment rate by five percentage points from one country to another increases 
growth by one-tenth of a percentage point. Combining the results reported in the first 
and fourth row in the table, we see that an increase in the enrolment rate by six points 
reduces the Gini coefficient by one point and this, in turn, increases growth further by 
0.03 percentage points. Further, combining the results reported in the first and second 
row in the table, we see that an increase in the enrolment rate by 25 points increases 
investment by one (≈ 25·1.42/35) percent of GDP and this, in turn, increases growth 
further by 0.1 percentage points. In sum, the total effect on growth of an increase in 
the enrolment rate by, say, 30 percentage points – a dire necessity in many developing 
countries – is about one percentage point, with the indirect effects through increased 
equality and increased investment accounting for about one-fourth of the total. 
However, the direct effect of distribution on growth, while significant throughout, is 
not very large: according to our estimate, it would take an increase of 33 points on the 
Gini scale from one country to another – corresponding to the difference in income 
distribution between Norway (Gini = 26) and South Africa (Gini = 59), thus 
extending from one end of the scale to the other – to produce a decrease in per capita 
growth by one percentage point per year on average.  
Next we want to explore the possibility of interaction between inequality and 
other determinants of growth, such as initial income, education and investment. The 
question here is this: Does inequality affect the responsiveness of growth to variations 
in its main determinants? We begin by replacing the Gini coefficient in the growth 
equation in Table 1 by the multiple of the Gini coefficient and initial income. We see 
  14in Table 2 that the results remain virtually the same as in Table 1 except for the 
changes in the coefficients of initial income and the new interaction variable. The 
speed of conditional convergence now depends on inequality: the composite 
coefficient of initial income is now -0.92 – 0,004·Gini ≈ -1.08 for given education, 
given the median value of the Gini coefficient in the sample (Gini = 40.3). Taking the 
effect of initial income on education into account, we see that the speed of absolute 
convergence is considerably lower, or -0.92 – 0,004·40.3 + (0.85/35)·20.90 ≈ -0.57. 
The results in Table 2 also suggest that changes in the distribution of income have 
stronger effects on growth in rich countries than in poor ones. Moreover, our cross-
country data support the notion of a Kuznets curve (see Gylfason and Zoega, 2003a): 
Inequality tends to increase with income at low levels of income and to decrease with 
income at higher levels of income.  
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 How about education? In Table 3 we have replaced the Gini coefficient from 
Table 1 with the multiple of the Gini coefficient and the secondary-school enrolment 
rate. Again, the results are virtually the same as in Table 1 except for the changes in 
the coefficients of the enrolment rate and the new interaction variable. The direct 
effect of education on growth is now 1.25/E  – 0.01·Gini/E ≈ 0.02, evaluated at the 
median values of E and Gini. This suggests that increased inequality in the 
distribution of income reduces the contribution of increased education to growth and 
also that the more educated the population, the stronger the adverse effect of increased 
inequality on economic growth.  
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A similar pattern emerges when we replace the multiple of the Gini coefficient 
and the secondary-school enrolment rate in Table 3 by the multiple of Gini and the 
investment rate (not shown). The effect of investment on growth varies inversely with 
the Gini coefficient, which implies that large inequalities tend to spoil the efficiency 
of investments in physical as well as human capital. Also, high investment, like high 
school-enrolment, exacerbates the effect of inequality on growth.  
When we replace the multiple of the Gini coefficient and the secondary-school 
enrolment rate in Table 3 by the multiple of Gini and our natural capital variable, both 
the natural capital variable and the new interaction variable turn insignificant (not 
shown). This suggests that inequality does not affect growth through natural 
resources. On the other hand, we have elsewhere reported evidence of interaction 
between inequality and natural capital in our growth equation suggesting that natural 
resources matter for growth through the distribution of income, among other channels 
(Gylfason and Zoega, 2003a).  
We also examined the possibility of interaction between initial income and 
education. Our results remained essentially unchanged except now the growth effect 
of increased secondary-school enrolment varied directly and significantly with initial 
income while the speed of convergence varied inversely with enrolment (not shown). 
Our estimates of other linkages, reported in Tables 1-3, were not affected by this 
change in specification.  
Our last experiment involves regional dummy variables. We want to make sure 
that the relationship between inequality and growth that we have documented here 
  16survives the introduction of dummies for Africa, Central and South America, and last 
but not least Asia. When we introduce a dummy for Africa into our model, either on 
its own or interacting with the Gini coefficient in the growth equation, the only 
material effect of this extension on our results is that our estimates of the effects of 
school enrolment on growth and of natural capital on investment become insignificant 
in a statistical sense. The results in Table 4 suggest that African countries have grown 
less rapidly than the rest of the world, invested less and sent fewer youngsters to 
secondary school, but only the growth effect is statistically significant. There is, in 
particular, no evidence that the Gini coefficient has been different in Africa than 
elsewhere. 
 
















































     -0.17 
(4.21) 
  0.32 -0.30 
(0.11) 
Note: t-ratios are shown within parentheses. Constant terms, statistically significant throughout, are 
not reported. The number of countries is the same as in Tables 1-3.  
 
When we repeat the experiment for Central and South America, we get the results 
shown in Table 5. Again, we find that the Central and South American countries have 
grown slightly less rapidly than the rest of the world, invested less, sent far fewer 
youngsters to secondary school and have had a vastly more unequal distribution of 
income – equivalent to 10 extra points in the Gini scale! However, only the last two 
effects are statistically significant. In other respects, the results in Table 5 are similar 
as in Table 1 except the direct effect of the Gini coefficient on growth becomes 
marginally insignificant.  
At last, we do the same for Asia. In Table 6, once again, our results do by and 
large remain unchanged. Now the regional dummy is significant in all four equations 
of our system. The Asian economies have grown faster, invested more, sent more of 
their youths to secondary school, and have tolerated less inequality in the distribution 
  17of income than the world at large. Thus, our results on inequality and growth around 
the world cannot be traced to Africa or Central and South America, nor, perhaps more 
surprisingly, can they be attributed to Asia’s remarkable combination of rapid 
economic growth and greater equality in the distribution of income than has been 
achieved elsewhere in the developing world.  
 


















































     -0.17 
(6.08) 
  0.49 10.22 
(5.08) 
Note: t-ratios are shown within parentheses. Constant terms, statistically significant throughout, are 
not reported. The number of countries is the same as in Tables 1-3.  
 
 
















































     -0.17 
(5.57) 
  0.36 -5.44 
(2.14) 
Note: t-ratios are shown within parentheses. Constant terms, statistically significant throughout, are not 




  185. Conclusion  
We have described intuitively how endogenous growth can arise in an overlapping 
generations model of education and growth and used it to argue that more and better 
education financed by public expenditure can encourage economic growth and reduce 
inequality in the distribution of income as well. We looked at data for 87 countries 
around the world and showed that, across countries, (i) economic growth varies 
inversely with inequality; (ii) three different measures of education intended to reflect 
education inputs, outcomes and participation are all inversely related to inequality; 
and (iii) economic growth varies directly with all three measures of education. We 
then used seemingly unrelated regression analysis to demonstrate that both education 
and inequality have a significant, independent impact on growth, even if education 
and inequality are closely correlated. Our conclusion is that education seems likely to 
encourage economic growth not only by increasing and improving human capital but 
also physical capital and social capital – that is, by reducing inequality. If so, the 
inverse association between inequality on economic growth since the mid-1960s that 
has been reported in the literature may in part reflect the favourable effects of more 
and better education on both economic growth and social equality.  
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